Critical Inquiry

Fall 1999
Volume 26, Number 1

Excerpt from
Extreme Criticism
by John Brenkman

The social and the aesthetic problematic of literature. . . meet in the problem of form itself. They also meet through the institutionalization of the public realm. The social practice of writing implicates literature in the polity's forms of publicness. The aesthetic experience of inner form, I want to argue, is also implicated in publicness. Among the most suggestive passages in Kant's Critique of Judgment is the section titled "Of Beauty as the Symbol of Morality." Its key assertion restates and extends his central tenet that the experience of the beautiful "gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of everyone else," which has most often been construed by Kant's advocates and detractors alike as equating the universalism of aesthetic judgment with some uniform standard of taste. Kant writes:

Now I say the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and that it is only in this respect . . . that it gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of everyone else. By this the mind is made conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere sensibility to pleasure received through the sense, and the worth of others is estimated in accordance with a like maxim of their judgment.6
Kant's insight here can be restated, in pragmatic terms, against the grain of his own search for intrinsic mental structures. The experience of the beautiful happens as a claim for the assent of others. Only insofar as I tacitly appeal to others that this is beautiful do I experience beauty; conversely, my experience of beauty tacitly carries within it this appeal to others. The artwork's appearance in a public realm and my own participation in that public realm with others are, in other words, internal to the experience of artistic form.

Aesthetic "judgment" is enabled by a material, institutionalized space of expression and criticism. The so-called universality of the judgment is thus conditioned by the education, cultivation, and discourse of the participants in the public sphere. In the guise of formulating a "critique of judgment," Kant evokes, to anticipate Hannah Arendt's phrase, the "worldly space" of criticism, that is, the democratic underpinnings of publicness. The beautiful is a symbol of the morally good in the sense that I affirm "the worth of others" in my tacit appeal for their agreement. However, since my experience of the beautiful is enmeshed in the practices of criticism, and since the appeal to agreement takes place on the socially uneven terrain of educated sensibility, aesthetic judgment is in fact drawn into the fray of critical contention and dispute. Estimating the worth of others does not celebrate a communal standard but prompts a task of persuasion. Add to this the post-Kantian view that artistic beauty arises not from harmonious form but from the illuminating, dappled counter-movements to formal coherence. Inner form is, therefore, the regulative ideal of aesthetic experience not in the sense of an established or anticipated standard of taste but, on the contrary, an open-ended, contentious valuing at stake in literary and political criticism.7

6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York, 1966), pp. 198-9.

7. Among Kant's commentators, Heidegger provides the strongest unconventional reading of the idea that the experience of the beautiful is, in Kant's phrase, "devoid of all interest." He assails the conventional reading, which he attributes to Schopenhauer: "If the relation to the beautiful, delight, is defined as 'disinterested,' then, according to Schopenhauer, the aesthetic state is one in which the will is put out of commision and all striving brought to a standstill; it is pure repose, simply wanting nothing more, sheer apathetic drift." Heidegger interprets Kant differently:

Whatever we take an interest in is always already taken, i.e., represented, with a view to something else. . . . Whatever exacts of us the judgment "This is beautiful" can never be an interest. That is to say, in order to find something beautiful, we must let what encounteres us, purely as it is in itself, come before us in its own stature and worth. We may not take it into account in advance with a view to something else, our goals and intentions, our possible enjoyment and advantage. Comportment toward the beautiful as such, says Kant, is unconstrained favoring. We must freely grant to what encounters us as such its way to be; we must allow and bestow upon it what belongs to it and what it brings to us.
Heidegger's purpose is to create a rapprochement between Kant's aestheic and Nietzsche's, despite Nietzsche's own conventional, Schopenhauerian reading of Kant. He cites Nietzsche to the effect that what is beautiful is "an expression of what is most worthy of honor," and then claims this is the Kantian conception of beauty: "For just this--purely to honor what is of worth in its apearance--is for Kant the essence of the beautiful." Kant's unconstrained favoring and disinterested delight he then equates with Nietzschean rapture:
the beautiful is what determines us, our behavior and our capability, to the extent that we are claimed supremely in our essence, which is to say, to the extent that we ascend beyond ourselves. . . . Thus the beautiful is disclosed in rapture. . . . If the beautiful is what sets the standard for what we trust we are essentially capable of, then the feeling of rapture, as our relation to the beautiful, can be no mere turbulence and ebullition.
(Martin Heidegger, The Will to Power as Art, vol.1 of Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York, 1979), pp. 108, 109, 111, 113)
The valuing that occurs in the experience of the beautiful does not measure the artwork against an established standard; Heidegger gets at this through the idea that the beautiful "corresponds to what we demand of ourselves" (p.112). There is something unprecedented about what is beautiful, something beyond the scope of our existing interests, representations, goals, intentions, and so on. Nietzsche and Heidegger encapsulate their sense of aesthetic rapture in their pseudo-aristocratic vocabulary of honor, nobility, and rank, and they seek in aesthetic experience intimations of what the age may hold of greatness and supremacy. Their idiom is antimodern. In Heidegger's own essays on art and poetry, his aesthetic valuings clearly bear the mark of his reactionary and authoritarian beliefs. My argument is twofold. On the one hand, aesthetic experience is a valuing that reaches beyond established taste and standards; on the other hand, that valuing is embroiled in the contentious, democratic or protodemocratic public realm of contending political convictions and historical visions. The conservative convictions and visions of a Heidegger are there to be contested; actively contesting them requires aesthetic valuings as forceful as his own.

John Brenkman is Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the City University of New York Graduate Center and Baruch College. He is the author of Culture and Domination (1987) and Straight Male Modern: A Cultural Critique of Psychoanalysis (1993), and is the editor of the literary magazine Venue.

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